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Abstract
While workers in developed countries have become increasingly concerned about the
impact that o⁄shoring and immigration have on their wages, the available evidence remains
mixed. This paper presents a simple model that examines the impact of o⁄shoring and
immigration on wages and tests these predictions using U.S. state-industry-year panel data.
According to the model, the productivity e⁄ect causes o⁄shoring to have a more positive
impact on low-skilled wages than immigration, but this gap decreases with the workers￿
skill level. The empirical results con￿rm both of these predictions and thus present direct
evidence of the productivity e⁄ect. Furthermore, the results provide important insight into
how speci￿c components of o⁄shoring and immigration a⁄ect the wages of particular types
of native workers.
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Workers in developed countries are becoming increasingly concerned about the impact of
o⁄shoring and immigration on their domestic labor markets.2 O⁄shoring and immigration
are the two factors that are of most concern to American workers: 77% of Americans think
that o⁄shoring has hurt them (13% believe it has helped) and 55% of Americans believe
immigration has hurt them (28% believe it has helped).3 While many American workers
blame their stagnant wages on the increased prevalence of o⁄shoring and immigration, the
available evidence on the link between o⁄shoring, immigration, and wages remains mixed.
In order to investigate the validity of these fears and clarify these relationships, this paper
presents a model that highlights the impact of o⁄shoring and immigration on wages and
then tests these predictions using a comprehensive data set.
The o⁄shoring of domestic jobs and the immigration of foreign workers are mechanisms
that increase the e⁄ective labor force available to domestic ￿rms. In this respect, o⁄shoring
and immigration will have a similar e⁄ect on wages. However, their impact on wages di⁄ers
if the bene￿ts associated with cross country wage di⁄erences accrue to di⁄erent factors of
production. Speci￿cally, with o⁄shoring the ￿rm captures the rents associated with cross
country wage di⁄erences but with immigration the migrant worker captures these rents.
A simple model is constructed that clari￿es these relationships between the o⁄shoring
of low-skilled tasks, low-skilled immigration, and wages. Both o⁄shoring and immigration
generate a labor-supply e⁄ect which depresses the wage of low-skilled workers but increases
the wage of high-skilled workers. O⁄shoring also generates a productivity e⁄ect which refers
to the cost savings that ￿rms enjoy after relocating some tasks abroad. The productivity
e⁄ect increases the wage of low-skilled workers but has no direct e⁄ect on the wage of high-
skilled workers. Immigration does not generate a productivity e⁄ect since the bene￿ts of
cross country wage di⁄erences are captured by the immigrants rather than the domestic
￿rms. Thus, comparing the impact of o⁄shoring and immigration on the wages of native
workers o⁄ers a unique opportunity to test for the presence of the productivity e⁄ect.
2O⁄shoring refers to the relocation of domestic jobs to foreign countries.
3￿Public Says American Work Life is Worsening, But Most Workers Remain Satis￿ed with Their Jobs,￿
Pew Research Center, 2006.
1Speci￿cally, due to the productivity e⁄ect, o⁄shoring has a more positive impact on low-
skilled wages than immigration (Proposition 1), but this gap decreases with the workers￿
skill level (Proposition 2).
The predicted impact of immigration and o⁄shoring on the wages of di⁄erent types of
native workers is then tested using a comprehensive U.S. data set that includes 48 states,
14 industries, and 7 years. This data is appealing because it exploits state and industry
variation over time and it includes service and manufacturing industries. The inclusion of
state, industry, year, state*year, and industry*year ￿xed e⁄ects means that factors such
as geographic di⁄erences, di⁄erences in industry productivity trends, and state macroeco-
nomic trends will be controlled for in this analysis. The endogeneity of the o⁄shoring and
immigration decision is addressed by taking advantage of the variation in these variables
that is exogenous to local demand shocks and wages. Speci￿cally, the o⁄shoring instrument
is constructed using variation in o⁄shoring that is driven by changes in foreign country
characteristics over time. The immigration instrument is constructed by taking advantage
of the fact that current immigrants often locate in areas where previous immigrants from
the same country already live (Bartel 1989). This instrumental variable estimation strategy
identi￿es the causal impact of o⁄shoring and immigration on native wages.
The results con￿rm both propositions of the model. O⁄shoring of low-skilled tasks in-
creases the wages of low-skilled native workers while low-skilled immigration has a slight
negative e⁄ect on these wages. However, o⁄shoring and immigration have a more similar
impact on the wages of high-skilled native workers. Thus, the empirical results provide
strong evidence of the productivity e⁄ect. The productivity e⁄ect is large enough to com-
pensate for the labor supply e⁄ect and causes o⁄shoring to actually increase the wages of
low-skilled native workers. This surprising result is fully consistent with the predictions of
the model.
An additional analysis examines the impact of o⁄shoring and immigration on native wage
deciles, rather than simply focusing on low-skilled and high-skilled wages. This provides a
more complete picture of how these forms of globalization a⁄ect the native wage distribution.
The results again con￿rm both predictions of the model and provide even stronger empirical
support for the productivity e⁄ect. O⁄shoring has a more positive impact on the wages at
2the low end of the distribution than immigration, but this gap decreases as the wage deciles
increase.
In addition, these results provide important insight into how speci￿c components of
o⁄shoring and immigration a⁄ect particular types of native workers. The implications of
o⁄shoring and immigration on wages depends on the skill level of the immigrant and on
the skill level of the o⁄shored tasks, which is identi￿ed using the level of development of
the foreign host country. Finally, these ￿ndings are robust to using an alternate o⁄shoring
instrument, to using a di⁄erent measure of income, to changes in the sample, and to alternate
speci￿cations.4
Some recent theoretical papers have examined the impact of o⁄shoring and immigration
on native wages (Jones 2005, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2008). These studies show
how o⁄shoring can lead to an increase in domestic wages and discuss the similarities and
di⁄erences of immigration. This paper builds upon this literature by constructing a model
that combines immigration and o⁄shoring into a single, uni￿ed framework. In particular,
a model is developed that incorporates immigration into a variation of the Grossman and
Rossi-Hansberg￿ s (2008) trade in task model. This produces speci￿c predictions about how
o⁄shoring and immigration a⁄ect di⁄erent types of native workers. Combining o⁄shoring
and immigration into a single framework also generates two testable predictions for the
presence of the productivity e⁄ect. This is an important contribution since it has been
di¢ cult for researchers to test for the productivity e⁄ect due to the lack of adequate trade
data. The empirical results that follow support both propositions of the model and thus
provide the ￿rst direct empirical evidence of the productivity e⁄ect.
While the links between o⁄shoring and wages (Feenstra and Hanson 1999, Slaughter
2000, Liu and Tre￿ er 2008, Ebenstein, Harrison, McMillan, and Phillips 2009) and immi-
gration and wages (Card 1990, Borjas 2003, Card 2005, Ottaviano and Peri 2008) have been
examined extensively with results varying substantially, few studies combine o⁄shoring and
immigration into a comprehensive empirical analysis. Not only does this provide a unique
opportunity to test for the productivity e⁄ect, it also allows for speci￿c components of
o⁄shoring and immigration to be compared. Con￿ icting results in the literature typically
4These additional results can be found in an online appendix.
3arise from papers using di⁄erent estimation strategies, unit of analyses, or data. However,
this paper shows that immigration and o⁄shoring have very di⁄erent impacts on native
wages depending on the skill level of immigrants and on the income level of the foreign
country. This improves our understanding of how these global forces a⁄ect the wages of
native workers and may reconcile some of the mixed results in the literature.
To the best of my knowledge, the only other papers that consider o⁄shoring and immi-
gration in a uni￿ed framework are Ottaviano, Peri, and Wright (2010) and Barba Navaretti,
Bertola, and Sembenelli (2008). The ￿rst paper complements this analysis in that it focuses
on the impact of o⁄shoring and immigration on employment rather than on wages. The
second paper examines the characteristics of Italian ￿rms that choose to o⁄shore but does
not look at the implications of o⁄shoring or immigration on wages. Furthermore, in contrast
to this analysis which includes a wide array of industries, both of these other papers focus
exclusively on the relatively small manufacturing sector.
Recent studies have provided highly publicized estimates of the number of U.S. jobs that
may be o⁄shored in the coming years (Blinder 2007, Jensen and Kletzer 2005, McKinsey
Global Institute 2005). While these papers o⁄er a rough estimate of the scope of o⁄shoring,
they do not address the implications of o⁄shoring for native workers. Between 22% - 29%
of all U.S. jobs are potentially o⁄shorable (Blinder 2007), but without a clear idea of how
o⁄shoring impacts domestic labor markets, interpreting these results is di¢ cult. This paper
￿lls this void by identifying how di⁄erent components of o⁄shoring a⁄ect particular types of
native workers. The results that follow suggest that certain types of o⁄shoring are bene￿cial
for particular types of native workers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. A simple model is constructed in the
next section which highlights the impact of o⁄shoring and immigration on wages. Section
3 describes the data used in this analysis and presents descriptive statistics while Section
4 presents the estimation strategy and describes the instrument used in the IV regressions.
The results are discussed in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes.
42 Model
Following Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), I model o⁄shoring as trade in tasks. The
productivity e⁄ect arises in an environment in which there are heterogeneous costs of o⁄-
shoring tasks, while the labor-supply e⁄ect arises in an environment in which there are
more factors of production than goods. Thus, in order to simply and clearly illustrate these
competing e⁄ects, the model focuses on a small economy that produces a single good using
two factors and that faces increasing costs of o⁄shoring tasks.5 In addition, immigration,
which leads to changes in the domestic labor supply, is included in the model. While other
authors have discussed the similarities and di⁄erences of o⁄shoring and immigration (Jones
2005, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2008), this is one of the few papers that incorporates
immigration into a trade in task framework. Combining o⁄shoring and immigration in a
uni￿ed model generates clear, testable predictions for the productivity e⁄ect.
Consider a small economy, such as a state, that takes the price and the foreign wage as
given and specializes in the production of a particular good Y. The production of good Y
requires L-workers, who are relatively less skilled, and H-workers, who are relatively more
skilled. There is a continuum of L-tasks and a continuum of H-tasks performed by each type
of worker. The tasks are de￿ned such that each task must be performed once in order to
produce a unit of good Y. Each L-task requires aL units of domestic low-skilled labor, and
each H-task requires aH units of domestic high-skilled labor. Substitution between L-tasks
and H-tasks is possible, and thus both unit requirements are chosen by the ￿rm in order
to minimize costs. Without loss of generality, the number of L and H tasks is normalized
to one. Therefore, aL and aH also indicate the amount of domestic L-labor and H-labor
necessary to produce a unit of good Y.
The costs associated with o⁄shoring vary by task. This can capture a number of di⁄erent
factors that can make some tasks inherently more di¢ cult to o⁄shore than others. For
5Including a second good in the model and relaxing the small country assumption would generate, in
addition to the productivity e⁄ect and labor-supply e⁄ect, a ￿relative-price e⁄ect￿caused by o⁄shoring. This
would put downward pressure on the low-skilled wage and upward pressure on the high-skilled wage via the
Stolper Samuelson Theorem (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2008). While this is an interesting extension,
the relative price e⁄ect is not crucial for this analysis, and thus I try to keep the model as simple as possible.
If anything, the relative price e⁄ect would work against the propositions of the model and the empirical
results that follow.
5instance, how routine or codi￿able the task is, or how much face to face contact is necessary
to carry out the task, or how easy it is to electronically transmit the output can all in￿ uence
how costly it is to o⁄shore a task (Blinder 2007). For the purposes of this analysis, we need
to simply recognize that the costs of o⁄shoring di⁄er by task. The L-tasks are ordered such
that the costs of o⁄shoring are increasing and it is assumed that it is prohibitively costly to
o⁄shore H-tasks. In addition, the immigration of L-workers to the home state is possible,
while the immigration of H-workers is negligible.6
Let w and w￿ be the wages of the L-workers in the home state and foreign country
respectively (with w > w￿). A ￿rm can produce task j domestically at a cost of waL, or
it can produce task j abroad at a cost of w￿aL￿g(j), where ￿ is a shift parameter that
captures changes in the cost of o⁄shoring and g(j) is a continuously di⁄erentiable function
with ￿g(j) ￿ 1 for all j. Firms o⁄shore tasks in order to take advantage of lower foreign
wages but face increasing costs of o⁄shoring, g0(j) > 0, due to the ordering of tasks. Thus,
there exists a task J such that the wage savings is exactly equal to the costs of o⁄shoring,
or
(1) w = ￿g(J)w￿.
If w < ￿g(j)w￿, then task j is performed at home, and if w > ￿g(j)w￿, then task j is
performed abroad. Therefore, tasks j 2 [0;J], which are relatively cheap to o⁄shore, are
carried out abroad and tasks j 2 (J;1], which are relatively expensive to o⁄shore, are carried
out at home. A reduction in the cost of o⁄shoring (d￿ < 0) leads to an increase in the share
of low-skilled tasks that are o⁄shored (dJ > 0).
If ￿rms optimally choose aL, aH, and the tasks to o⁄shore, then pro￿t maximization
implies that price equals marginal cost
6While these assumptions are consistent with the ￿ndings that o⁄shoring of high-skilled jobs and high-
skilled immigration are relatively small, these restrictions will be relaxed in the empirical analysis that
follows.




where s represents the high-skilled wage and aL and aH are functions of the relative average
costs of the two sets of tasks. The ￿rst term on the right-hand side represents the costs
paid to domestic low-skilled workers since (1 ￿ J) tasks are performed at home with aL
low-skilled labor needed for each task. The second term on the right-hand side represents
the costs of hiring foreign low-skilled workers. Since the costs vary across each task, we
integrate from 0 to J. The third term is the costs of hiring native high-skilled workers.
Substituting (1) into (2) yields the following zero-pro￿t condition:
(3) P = ￿(J)waL(￿w=s) + saH(￿w=s),
where








Here the dependence of the factor intensities aL and aH on the relative average costs is
explicitly stated. If J = 0, then no tasks are o⁄shored, ￿(J) = 1, and the zero-pro￿t
condition is of the standard form. Since g0(j) > 0, by the ordering of tasks, it can be shown
that ￿(J) < 1 as long as J > 0. Therefore, the costs to the ￿rm after o⁄shoring some
tasks are less than if they chose to perform all L-tasks domestically. Finally, an increase
in the share of low-skilled tasks that are o⁄shored (dJ > 0) leads to a decrease in ￿rms￿
costs (d￿(J) < 0).7 O⁄shoring leads to a reduction in ￿rms￿costs through the extensive
margin because more tasks are o⁄shored and through the intensive margin because it is







0(J) which is negative when J > 0: Purely for notational convenience ￿(J) will be
simpli￿ed to ￿ below.
7Domestic ￿rms reduce their costs by optimally choosing the tasks to o⁄shore. Since
o⁄shoring is a deliberate action on the part of the ￿rm, o⁄shoring features prominently
in the ￿rms￿pro￿t maximizing decision in (3). In contrast, immigration is determined by
factors largely exogenous to the ￿rm, such as changes in immigration policies or foreign
economic conditions. Furthermore, since domestic ￿rms are not allowed to discriminate
against immigrants by paying them lower wages, an increase in immigration does not directly
reduce ￿rms￿costs.8 Thus, immigration does not a⁄ect the pro￿t maximizing decision facing
the ￿rm in (3). Unlike o⁄shoring, the bene￿ts associated with country wage di⁄erences are
captured by the immigrants rather than the domestic ￿rm. However, both o⁄shoring and
immigration will have important implications for the market-clearing conditions that follow.
Each ￿rm performs (1 ￿ J) L-tasks at home and all H-tasks at home. Domestic ￿rms
hire native low-skilled workers and low-skilled immigrants to perform the (1 ￿ J) L-tasks.
Therefore, the market-clearing conditions are
(4) (1 ￿ J)aL(￿w=s)Y = (1 + I)N
and
(5) aH(￿w=s)Y = H,
where I 2 [0;1] is the ratio of immigrant low-skilled workers to native low-skilled workers
and N is the supply of native low-skilled workers. Thus, the right-hand side of (4) represents
the domestic low-skilled labor supply which consists of native and immigrant workers. H
is the supply of native skilled workers.
Using the zero pro￿t condition and the market clearing conditions, we can examine
how an increase in o⁄shoring or an increase in immigration a⁄ects domestic wages. Totally
8As long as employers cannot fully discriminate against immigrants by paying them the prevailing wage
in their source country, the cost savings under o⁄shoring will exceed that under immigration. Furthermore,
if employers can fully discriminate, then there would be no di⁄erence between o⁄shoring and immigration
which would work against the empirical ￿ndings of this paper.
8di⁄erentiating equation (3), assuming that P is the numeraire, yields
(6) ￿L( ^ w + ^ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿L)^ s = 0,
where ￿L is low-skilled labor￿ s share of total costs and hats represent a percent change.
Di⁄erentiating the ratio of (4) to (5) gives9







where ￿ is the elasticity of substitution between the set of L-tasks and the set of H-tasks.
Combining (6) and (7) yields the percent change in the wage of low-skilled workers as a
function of changes in o⁄shoring and immigration:











The ￿rst term on the right-hand side of (8) is the productivity e⁄ect. As the cost of
o⁄shoring decreases (d￿ < 0), more tasks are o⁄shored (dJ > 0), and thus the cost of
performing the L-tasks declines (^ ￿ < 0 ). Lower costs are equivalent to an increase in
productivity of low-skilled labor. Higher productivity increases the demand for low-skilled
workers and raises their wage. This is analogous to technical change that bene￿ts low-skilled
labor. The second term on the right-hand side of (8) is the labor-supply e⁄ect of o⁄shoring.
As the cost of o⁄shoring decreases (d￿ < 0), more L-tasks are o⁄shored (dJ > 0), and
thus some low-skilled workers become unemployed. In order to absorb this excess supply
of workers back into the labor market, the low-skilled wage declines. Together the ￿rst and
second terms of equation (8) represent the impact of o⁄shoring on the wage of low-skilled
workers in this model. The third term on the right-hand side of (8) is the labor-supply
e⁄ect caused by immigration. The excess supply of low-skilled workers due to immigration
9See Appendix for derivation.
9reduces the low-skilled wage. From equation (8), the following proposition is immediate:
Proposition 1 Due to the productivity e⁄ect, o⁄shoring has a more positive impact on the
wage of low-skilled workers than immigration.
While both o⁄shoring and immigration generate a labor-supply e⁄ect, o⁄shoring also
generates a productivity e⁄ect that increases the wages of low-skilled workers. The pro-
ductivity e⁄ect is larger when more tasks are already being done abroad (J > 0) because
the cost savings at the intensive margin will be larger. The cost savings at the extensive
margin is negligible due to the envelope theorem. The labor-supply e⁄ect is small when the
share of low-skilled labor in total costs (￿L) is large or when H-tasks and L-tasks are good
substitutes (￿ is large). Thus, under these conditions, the productivity e⁄ect will exceed
the labor-supply e⁄ect and o⁄shoring will increase the wages of low-skilled workers. This
generates the seemingly counterintuitive result that o⁄shoring can bene￿t the factor whose
tasks are being sent abroad.
Immigration, on the other hand, unambiguously decreases the wage of low-skilled labor
in this model. Immigration does not generate a productivity e⁄ect because the bene￿ts of
country wage di⁄erences are captured by the immigrants rather than the domestic ￿rm.
Unlike o⁄shoring, immigration does not generate any direct cost savings for domestic ￿rms
since they pay immigrants and native workers the same market wage.
Using (6) and (7), it is also possible to derive the percent change in the wage of high-
skilled workers as a function of changes in o⁄shoring and immigration:











Here the labor-supply e⁄ect of o⁄shoring and immigration increases the wage of high-skilled
workers. As is common in a two factor model, an increase in the e⁄ective supply of low-
skilled labor increases the marginal product and wage of high-skilled workers. O⁄shoring
does not generate a productivity e⁄ect for high-skilled workers because a decrease in the
costs of o⁄shoring (d￿ < 0) reduces the ￿rms￿costs of performing L-tasks with no e⁄ect on
the costs of performing H-tasks. In other words, there is no direct impact of o⁄shoring on
10the productivity of skilled workers although o⁄shoring can indirectly a⁄ect the skilled wage
through the labor-supply e⁄ect. Comparing equations (8) and (9) establishes the following
proposition:
Proposition 2 Due to the productivity e⁄ect, the impact of o⁄shoring and immigration on
wages becomes more similar as the workers￿skill level increases.
The labor-supply e⁄ects generated by o⁄shoring and immigration have a negative impact
on the low-skilled wage and a positive impact on high-skilled wage. However, the productiv-
ity e⁄ect generated by o⁄shoring only impacts the low-skilled wage since o⁄shoring a⁄ects
the costs of performing L-tasks but not H-tasks. Thus, o⁄shoring and immigration di⁄er in
their impact on the low-skilled wage but have a similar impact on high-skilled wages.
The ￿nding that the productivity e⁄ect only impacts the low-skilled wage is an inter-
esting and important result. The reduction in costs associated with o⁄shoring L-tasks is
analogous to an increase in the productivity of low-skilled workers which, in a general equi-
librium context, drives up their wage. The costs associated with performing the H-tasks
is unchanged and thus o⁄shoring does not generate a productivity e⁄ect for the skilled
wage.10
The model focuses on the o⁄shoring of low-skilled tasks and the immigration of low-
skilled workers in part because recent experience has indicated that these are particularly
important components of globalization, especially in the U.S. However, the model can
easily be extended to include the o⁄shoring of high-skilled tasks and the immigration of
high-skilled workers. This would not change the existing results of the model but would
rather add analogous productivity and labor-supply e⁄ects generated by skilled o⁄shoring
and immigration that work in the opposite direction. Speci￿cally, the o⁄shoring of high-
skilled tasks would generate its own productivity e⁄ect that would increase the wage of
high-skilled workers but have no impact on the wage of low-skilled workers. In addition,
10Abstracting from the model, there are certainly other plausible explanations for who captures the savings
associated with o⁄shoring. For instance, capital owners, entrepreneurs, consumers, or even skilled workers
may also bene￿t from the cost savings generated by o⁄shoring. However, the empirical results that follow
are consistent with the predictions of the model and indicate that the productivity e⁄ect increases the wages
of low-skilled workers with little impact on high-skilled wages. Additional results in the appendix suggest
that these alternate hypotheses are relatively less important.
11both skilled o⁄shoring and skilled immigration would generate a labor-supply e⁄ect that
would depress the high-skilled wage and increase the low-skilled wage. While not the focal
point of this model, these other types of o⁄shoring and immigration will be controlled for
in the empirical analysis.
The productivity and labor-supply e⁄ects generated by o⁄shoring are not speci￿c to the
assumptions of the model presented in this paper. They are quite general ￿ndings that arise
in a wide variety of di⁄erent theoretical frameworks.11 However, the model outlined in this
paper is appealing because it incorporates immigration into this trade in task framework and
yet simply and clearly compares the competing productivity and labor-supply e⁄ects. Fur-
thermore, an especially nice aspect of this model is that it highlights a unique opportunity
to test for the productivity e⁄ect by comparing the impact of o⁄shoring and immigration
on wages. Speci￿cally, due to the productivity e⁄ect o⁄shoring and immigration should
have a di⁄erent impact on the wage distributions within an industry. The remainder of the
paper examines whether there is empirical evidence that wages respond to o⁄shoring and
immigration in the manner predicted by Propositions 1 and 2.
3 Data
Using state, industry, and year variation, the empirical analysis that follows will test these
predictions by estimating the impact of o⁄shoring and immigration on the wages of U.S.
native workers. Speci￿cally, each state-industry labor market is characterized by the econ-
omy discussed in the model and di⁄erences across states, industries, and years are used to
identify the impact of o⁄shoring and immigration on the native wage distribution. Thus, the
data set utilized in this analysis spans the 48 contiguous U.S. states, 14 NAICS industries,
and 7 years (2000-2006).
3.1 Immigration and O⁄shoring Variables
Census and American Community Survey data on employed individuals who earn a positive
wage, are not in school, and are between the ages of 18 and 65 is obtained from the Integrated
11See Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) for a discussion of the productivity e⁄ect and the labor-supply
e⁄ect in many of these di⁄erent environments.
12Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS). From these individual census observations, native
wage percentiles are constructed for each state-industry-year observation.
Low-skilled immigration is calculated as the share of employed individuals who are
foreign born and have a high school degree or less. This is consistent with I from the
model. In addition, the following control variables are calculated for each observation: the
share of high-skilled immigrants, the share of native employees that are male, the share of
native employees that are of a particular race and marital status, and the average age and
average educational attainment of native workers.
Data on o⁄shoring, de￿ned as the number of employees at majority-owned foreign a¢ l-
iates of U.S. ￿rms, is obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).12 Given
the trade in task model, focusing on foreign a¢ liate employment is preferable to other mea-
sures of foreign direct investment such as a¢ liate sales. The BEA provides foreign a¢ liate
employment data by year, industry, and country of the foreign a¢ liate.
The empirical analysis focuses on the o⁄shoring of low-skilled tasks to less-developed
countries.13 This is consistent with the model in two important ways. First, o⁄shoring to
less-developed countries typically entails relocating particular production tasks abroad in
order to take advantage of low foreign wages. This vertical o⁄shoring is exactly the type
of o⁄shoring modeled in the trade in task framework. In contrast, o⁄shoring to developed
countries typically entails relocating the entire production process abroad in order to avoid
transport costs. Second, o⁄shoring to less-developed countries typically, although not al-
ways, entails the o⁄shoring of low-skilled tasks. This is consistent with the assumption of
the model that the o⁄shoring of L-tasks is possible while the o⁄shoring of H-tasks is pro-
hibitively expensive. Thus, o⁄shoring to less-developed countries is most consistent with
the type of o⁄shoring envisioned in the model.
12While the model does not draw a distinction between o⁄shoring tasks to foreign a¢ liates or foreign arms-
length suppliers, the empirical section of this paper will focus on the o⁄shoring of jobs to foreign a¢ liates
due to data constraints. Constructing a proxy of o⁄shoring that includes arms-length suppliers (Feenstra
and Hanson 1999) is only possible in the manufacturing sector which would severly limit the sample. Since
o⁄shoring to arms-length suppliers is di¢ cult to measure, and given that o⁄shoring to foreign a¢ liates is
relatively less labor intensive (Antras 2003), this de￿nition represents a lower bound on the total amount of
o⁄shoring.
13The BEA does not provide information on the skill level of foreign a¢ liate employees. Thus, low-skilled
o⁄shoring is measured using foreign a¢ liate employment in less-developed countries. This is calculated as
the di⁄erence between total foreign a¢ liate employment and foreign a¢ liate employment in Europe, Canada,
Australia, and Japan.
13Since o⁄shoring data is not available by state, foreign a¢ liate employment (FAE) is
distributed across states based on the share of state GDP to national GDP in that industry.
Given the potential correlation between GDP and wages, the pre-sample 1999 GDP shares
are used to construct the o⁄shoring measure. Finally, the share of foreign a¢ liate employ-
ment to total employment, including both domestic and foreign employment, is calculated













where s indexes states, i indicates industries, and t references years. This measure of o⁄-
shoring is consistent with J from the model which captures the share of L-tasks that are
o⁄shored. O⁄shoring to developed countries and inshoring, de￿ned as the number of em-
ployees at majority-owned U.S. a¢ liates of foreign ￿rms, were constructed in an analogous
manner and will be important control variables. Comparing total o⁄shoring to data from
the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program indicates that this method of distributing
foreign a¢ liate employment across states is accurate.14
3.2 Appealing Aspects of the Data
Despite the limitations of the BEA data, this data set has a number of appealing features.
First, using U.S. state level data is preferable to a cross country analysis where it is di¢ cult
to control for unobserved factors. Since U.S. states share similar laws, institutions, and
cultural characteristics, using states as the unit of analysis limits these confounding factors.
Together with the variation in o⁄shoring and immigration across states, this means that the
link between these forms of globalization and wages is more easily identi￿ed. In addition,
state level data mitigates many of the mobility concerns associated with a city or county
level study. Thus, states more closely resemble a closed labor market while still o⁄ering a
substantial amount of variation.
14The TAA program has data on the number of domestic workers who are displaced due to import
competition. While these variables measure slightly di⁄erent things, the correlation coe¢ cient between
these two variables is 0.8.
14Second, this analysis incorporates 14 2-digit NAICS industries which range from man-
ufacturing to professional services to ￿nance.15 Due to data constraints, many previous
studies focus just on manufacturing industries (Feenstra and Hanson 1999, Harrison and
McMillan 2006, Amiti and Wei 2009, Ottaviano et al. 2010). However, manufacturing rep-
resents only 13% of total U.S. GDP in 2008.16 Unlike these previous studies which study
a small component of the U.S. economy, this analysis examines how o⁄shoring and immi-
gration a⁄ect wages in a wide variety of industries. Furthermore, by focusing on highly
aggregated NAICS industries and a relatively short time period, mobility across industries
is less problematic. In addition, any potential bias associated with mobility across industries
or states would attenuate the results.
Finally, the years included in this analysis span exogenous shocks to both o⁄shoring and
immigration caused by China joining the World Trade Organization in 2001 and changes
to immigration policy following 9/11.
3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Figure 1 plots average immigration and o⁄shoring by state. Not surprisingly, the urban
coastal states of California, New York, and New Jersey have high shares of both, Florida
and Nevada have high shares of immigration, midwestern rust-belt states such as Michigan
and Indiana have a high shares of o⁄shoring, and rural isolated states such as Montana
and North Dakota have low shares of both. This variation in o⁄shoring and immigration is
consistent with anecdotal evidence and provides additional con￿rmation that the allocation
of foreign a¢ liate employment across states is accurate.
Figure 2 plots average immigration and o⁄shoring by industry. Not surprisingly, there
is a lot of o⁄shoring in manufacturing but relatively little in construction, real estate,
and health care. There are high immigrant shares in accommodations, administration, and
agriculture while utilities, ￿nance, and information have relatively little immigration. The
substantial variation in wages, immigration, and o⁄shoring across states and industries
15Available BEA data on foreign a¢ liate employment restricts the analysis to these 14 industries. More
disaggregated foreign a¢ liate employment data by industry-country-year has many more missing values
due to con￿dentiality concerns. "Agriculture" and "mining" were combined and "professional services" and
"management" were combined due to a lack of census observations by state in these industries.
16Gross Domestic Product by Industry Accounts (BEA).
15supports the assertion that a state-industry labor market is reasonably closed. Although
the ￿xed e⁄ects will capture much of the variation in Figures 1 and 2, these ￿gures provide
insight into the dimensions and nature of the data set used in this analysis.
To gain a sense of the variation exploited in this analysis, I need to eliminate the variation
that will be captured by the various ￿xed e⁄ects. This is done by ￿rst regressing the median
native wage, o⁄shoring, and immigration variables on year, state, industry, state*year, and
industry*year ￿xed e⁄ects. The residuals from these regressions will be the variation left
after accounting for the ￿xed e⁄ects which is the focus of this analysis. The median wage
residuals and o⁄shoring residuals are plotted in Figure 3 while the median wage residuals
and immigration residuals are plotted in Figure 4. It is evident in Figure 3 that o⁄shoring is
associated with a higher median native wage. However, there is little relationship between
immigration and the median native wage in Figure 4. These basic scatter plots suggest
that there is an important di⁄erence between the impact of o⁄shoring and immigration on
native wages. However, to more accurately test the propositions of the model, it is necessary
to examine the causal impact of low-skilled o⁄shoring and low-skilled immigration on the
wages of di⁄erent types of native workers.
4 Estimation Strategy
4.1 Speci￿cation
To test the propositions of the model, the empirical analysis examines the key relationships
of the model speci￿ed in equations (8) and (9). Speci￿cally, the impact of o⁄shoring and
immigration on low-skilled wages is estimated by adding an error term, ￿sit, to (8). The error
term captures unobserved factors not explicitly included in the model that may in￿ uence
wages. This generates the following estimation equation
L_wagesit = ￿0 + ￿1L_Offsit + ￿2L_Imgsit + ￿sit,
where s indexes states, i indexes industries, t indexes years, and L_wage is the ln of
the 25th percentile native wage. L_Off is o⁄shoring of low-skilled tasks and will capture
16the productivity and labor-supply e⁄ects generated by o⁄shoring (the ￿rst two terms on the
right hand side of (8)). L_img is low-skilled immigration and will capture the labor-supply
e⁄ect generated by immigration (the third term on the right hand side of (8)). It is assumed
that ￿sit takes the following form
￿sit = ￿
0
3Xsit + ￿s + ￿i + ￿t +  st + ￿it + "sit,
where X is a set of control variables, ￿s are state ￿xed e⁄ects, ￿i are industry ￿xed
e⁄ects, ￿t are year ￿xed e⁄ects,  st are state*year ￿xed e⁄ects, ￿it are industry*year ￿xed
e⁄ects, and "sit is measurement error. The X matrix includes other globalization variables,
such as o⁄shoring to developed countries, high-skilled immigration, and inshoring, as well
as demographic controls of the native population. The inclusion of state, industry, and
year ￿xed e⁄ects means that factors such as geographic di⁄erences, di⁄erences in indus-
try productivities, and macroeconomic factors will be controlled for in this analysis. The
state*year and industry*year ￿xed e⁄ects will capture trends such as growth in states over
time and changes in industry productivity over time which may be correlated with wages,
immigration, and o⁄shoring.17
Applying a similar transformation to (9) generates the two key estimation equations:
(10) L_wagesit = ￿0+￿1L_Offsit+￿2L_Imgsit+￿
0
3Xsit+￿s+￿i+￿t+ st+￿it+"sit,
(11) H_wagesit = ￿0+￿1L_Offsit+￿2L_Imgsit+￿
0
3Xsit+￿s+￿i+￿t+ st+￿it+"sit,
where H_wage is the ln of the 75th percentile native wage. Proposition 1 of the model
predicts that ￿1 > ￿2 while Proposition 2 of the model predicts that ￿1 = ￿2.
While consistent with the model, estimating the impact of o⁄shoring and immigration
17Unfortunately, there is not enough annual variation to include state*industry, state*year, and indus-
try*year ￿xed e⁄ects.
17on the 25th and 75th wage percentiles may miss important implications for other parts of
the native wage distribution. To gain greater insight into the impact on the entire wage
distribution, the e⁄ect of o⁄shoring and immigration on di⁄erent wage deciles of native
workers is examined. Furthermore, this is especially useful in testing Proposition 2 of the
model. Thus, the following equation will be estimated:
(12) wagesitd = ￿0 +￿1L_Offsit +￿2L_Imgsit +￿
0
3Xsit +￿s +￿i +￿t + st +￿it +"sitd:
where d indexes native wage deciles. Separate regressions are run for each native wage decile.
The model predicts that due to the productivity e⁄ect ￿1 > ￿2 for low wage deciles but as
the native wage deciles increase the productivity e⁄ect diminishes and thus the di⁄erence
between ￿1 and ￿2 decreases .18
4.2 Instruments
The inclusion of a wide range of control variables and numerous ￿xed e⁄ects limits the
endogeneity problem. However, a remaining potential issue is that an industry-state spe-
ci￿c labor demand shock may be correlated with wages, immigration, and o⁄shoring. For
instance, an increase in the productivity of low-skilled workers could increase the demand
for these workers and drive up their wage, which may encourage immigration and provide
an incentive to o⁄shore. To address these endogeneity concerns, this paper constructs in-
struments for the o⁄shoring and immigration variables. Essentially these instruments use
the variation in o⁄shoring and immigration that is driven by factors in foreign countries
which is exogenous to local demand shocks and wages.
The o⁄shoring instrument is constructed by ￿rst regressing the foreign a¢ liate employ-
ment data on industry-year and country-year ￿xed e⁄ects.19 The country-year coe¢ cients
are then used to construct the instrument while the industry-year coe¢ cients are discarded.
18Quantile regressions are not used because the goal of this analysis is to examine the impact of o⁄shoring
and immigration on the overall wage distribution not on the wage distribution conditional on the control
variables (essentially the distribution of the error term). Furthermore, the di⁄erent levels of aggregation
between wages, which would need to be at the individual level, and the globalization variables, which are at
the state-industry level, make quantile regressions impossible.
19Ottaviano, Peri, and Wright (2010) use a similar method to calculate their "imputed o⁄shoring" measure.
18The concern is that the industry-year variation may be driven in part by local demand shocks
that could be correlated with wages. In contrast, the country-year variation is driven by
changes in foreign country characteristics over time. Percent changes in the country-year
coe¢ cients are then multiplied by the pre-sample 1999 level of o⁄shoring across industries
in each country. This generates a predicted measure of U.S. o⁄shoring that is driven by
changes in the foreign country and that is independent of domestic factors. Finally, the
predicted measure of foreign a¢ liate employment is aggregated and attributed to states
based on the methodology discussed in section 3.1.
The immigration instrument takes advantage of the fact that immigrants often settle
in areas where previous immigrants from the same country already live (Bartel 1989).20
Speci￿cally, the instrument is constructed by assigning actual immigrants in the current year
to state-industries where immigrants from the same region of the world were located in the
initial year.21 The sum of immigrants across the regions is then divided by total employment
to get the predicted immigrant share for each skill group. This instrument captures variation
in immigration that is due to factors in the foreign country that in￿ uence the total number of
immigrants and which will a⁄ect states and industries di⁄erently depending on the initial
distribution of immigrants. Thus, the variation in immigration that is driven by labor
demand factors and that may be endogenous to wages is eliminated.
To be valid, these o⁄shoring and immigration instruments need to be correlated with
the potentially endogenous variables and uncorrelated with the error term, ", in the sec-
ond stage. While the former condition is easily tested using the ￿rst stage F-stat of the
instruments, the latter is not since the over-identi￿cation test is not possible given that the
number of instruments equals the number of endogenous variables. However, it is likely
that the exclusion restriction is satis￿ed since variation in o⁄shoring and immigration that
is driven by changes in foreign country characteristics is unlikely to be correlated with un-
observed factors at the industry-state level that a⁄ect wages. This is even more plausible
given the inclusion of the state, industry, year, state*year, and industry*year ￿xed e⁄ects.
20This instrument is similar to the one used by Card (2001), Cortes (2008), and Peri and Sparber (2009).
Ottaviano, Peri, and Wright (2010) construct a similar "imputed immigration" measure that uses di⁄erences
in the presence of immigrant groups across industries.
21The eight regions of the world are U.S. Areas, Canada, Central America, South America, Europe, Asia,
Africa, and Oceania.
195 Results
5.1 Low-Skilled and High-Skilled Wages
The OLS results of estimating (10) and (11) are reported in the ￿rst two columns of Table
1. All regressions are weighted by the sample size, include the full set of ￿xed e⁄ects, and
have robust standard errors in brackets. The results are interesting and provide preliminary
support for the predictions of the model. Low-skilled o⁄shoring has a more positive impact
on the low-skilled native wage than on the high-skilled native wage. Speci￿cally, a one
percentage point increase in the share of o⁄shoring increases the low-skilled wage 4.4%
and increases the high-skilled wage by 1.0%. Low-skilled immigration has a slight negative
impact on both the low-skilled and high-skilled wage.
The coe¢ cients on these two key variables of interest are consistent with the predictions
of the model. O⁄shoring has a more positive impact on low-skilled wages than immigration
which supports Proposition 1 of the model. However, o⁄shoring and immigration have a
relatively similar impact on high-skilled wages which supports Proposition 2 of the model.
Furthermore, the magnitude and sign of the coe¢ cients indicate that the productivity is
important but that the labor-supply e⁄ect is small.
Columns three and four in Table 1 report the IV results from estimating (10) and
(11). The IV results indicate that a one percentage point increase in o⁄shoring increases
the low-skilled wage 4.8% while a one percentage point increase in immigration decreases
the low-skilled wage 0.2%. A one percentage point increase in o⁄shoring increases the
high-skilled wage 1.6% while a one percentage point increase in immigration decreases the
high-skilled wage 0.1%. Again, o⁄shoring has a more positive impact on low-skilled wages
than immigration but this gap decreases with the workers￿skill level. The productivity
e⁄ect is empirically important at the low end of the wage distribution but as it dissipates
the impact of o⁄shoring and immigration on wages becomes more similar.
While not the focal point of this analysis, the coe¢ cients on the other globalization mea-
sures are interesting. O⁄shoring to developed countries is measured by the H_Offshoring
variable and typically entails replicating the production process abroad in order to access
foreign markets and save on transport costs. Since foreign workers are substituting for
20domestic workers it is not surprising that H_Offshoring depresses native wages in the
IV regressions in Table 1. We also see that high-skilled immigration has a slight negative
impact on the wages of high-skilled native workers. Not surprisingly inshoring increases
native wages.
Comparing the OLS and IV results in Table 1 indicates that the OLS coe¢ cients on
L_Offshoring are biased down while the coe¢ cients on L_Immigration, H_Offshoring,
and H_Immigration are biased up. This suggest that a positive local demand or produc-
tivity shock, which increases wages, decreases o⁄shoring to less developed countries but
increases o⁄shoring to developed countries. The positive bias in the immigration coe¢ -
cients indicates that immigrants, particularly relatively mobile high-skilled immigrants, are
attracted to high wage states and industries. While there is some evidence of endogeneity
bias in the OLS regressions, overall the main ￿ndings in both the OLS and IV results are
consistent with the propositions of the model.
Table 2 reports the ￿rst stage IV results. Each of the four instruments have a strong
impact on the globalization variable it was designed to predict. All of these coe¢ cients
are positive and signi￿cant at the one percent level. The ￿rst stage F-stat on the excluded
instruments is above 63 in all regressions.
5.2 Wage Deciles
To gain greater insight into how o⁄shoring and immigration a⁄ect the native wage distribu-
tion, equation (12) is estimated. Speci￿cally, separate regressions are run using each native
wage decile as the dependent variable. The OLS results are reported in Table 3.22
Again the results support both propositions of the model. L_Offshoring has a more
positive impact on low-skilled native wages than L_Immigration but this di⁄erence de-
creases as the wage deciles increase. Speci￿cally, the second proposition of the model, that
the impact of o⁄shoring and immigration on wages becomes more similar as the workers
skill level increases, is veri￿ed at multiple points in the native wage distribution. The more
22Unfortunately, the Census replaces wage values above $200,000 with the state average of these wage
values regardless of industry. While it is important to include these ￿ top coded￿observations in order to
maintain an accurate wage distribution, regressions using the 90th wage decile as the independent variable
are biased and are therefore not reported.
21comprehensive wage decile analysis provides even more compelling evidence in support of
the propositions of the model.
The results in Table 3 also indicate that the components of o⁄shoring and immigration
have very di⁄erent impacts on native wages. L_Offshoring increases the wages of many
native workers, particularly at the low end of the distribution, while H_Offshoring de-
creases the wages of many native workers. However, L_Immigration decreases the wages
of native workers while H_Immigration increases the wages of native workers. These con-
trasting results highlight the importance of controlling for the immigrant skill level and skill
level of o⁄shored tasks using the level of development of the foreign country.
In addition to di⁄erences between the independent variables, there are also important
di⁄erences in how o⁄shoring and immigration impact various types of native workers. An
appealing aspect of using native wage deciles is the ability to examine how o⁄shoring and
immigration a⁄ect wage inequality. The results in Table 3 indicate that L_Offshoring
decreases wage inequality since the wages at the low end of the distribution increase by
relatively more than the wages at the high end. However, H_Offshoring increases wage
inequality. In contrast, immigration does not have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on wage inequality.
Table 3 indicates that both types of immigration have a relatively constant e⁄ect on the
wages of di⁄erent types of native workers.
Table 4 reports the IV wage decile results. The IV analysis is appealing because it
identi￿es a causal impact of o⁄shoring and immigration on native wages by exploiting
the variation in o⁄shoring and immigration that is exogenous to local demand and wage
conditions. The coe¢ cients imply that, for instance, a one percentage point increase in low-
skilled o⁄shoring increases the median wage 3.5%, while a one percentage point increase in
low-skilled immigration decreases the median wage 0.2%. Overall, the results in Table 4
provide even stronger support for Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 of the model. O⁄shoring
generates a productivity e⁄ect that more than compensates for the labor supply e⁄ect at the
low end of the wage distribution. However, as the wage deciles increase, the productivity
e⁄ect diminishes, and thus the impact that o⁄shoring and immigration have on native wages
converges.
The L_Offshoring and L_Immigration coe¢ cients and their 95% con￿dence intervals
22from Table 4 are plotted in Figure 5. The ￿gure shows that o⁄shoring has a more positive
impact on the wages of low-skilled native workers than immigration (consistent with Propo-
sition 1 of the model), but this gap decreases as the wage deciles increase (consistent with
Proposition 2 of the model). According to the model, low-skilled immigration generates
only a labor-supply e⁄ect that depresses the wages of low-skilled workers and increases the
wages of high-skilled workers. The L_Immigration coe¢ cients suggest that the labor-
supply e⁄ect is relatively small. In contrast, the productivity e⁄ect, which is represented
by the vertical distance between the two lines in Figures 5, is relatively large particularly
at the low end of the distribution where the model predicts it should be strongest.
One potential concern is that the o⁄shoring of low-skilled tasks and low-skilled immi-
gration may simply displace the least skilled, lowest wage decile native workers. As these
low-skilled native workers become unemployed, each wage decile would then capture a
slightly more educated, higher paid native worker. However, the inclusion of the average
education attainment of the native population variable, which proved to be an important
control, will account for these types of compositional shifts in employment. Furthermore,
if this compositional shift in employment was driving these results, one would observe o⁄-
shoring and immigration leading to an initial increase in all the native wage deciles.23 The
fact that neither the L_Offshoring nor the L_Immigration coe¢ cients exhibit these
patterns indicates that there is little empirical support for this hypothesis.
In contrast, the model predicts that o⁄shoring and immigration will displace low-skilled
native workers and depress their wages via the labor-supply e⁄ect. Thus, the model is fully
consistent with this displacement hypothesis but the implications for native wages are quite
di⁄erent. The fact that the empirical results provide support for this labor-supply e⁄ect
and not for the composition shift in employment story further strengthens the arguments
presented in this paper.
23Given the exponential distribution of wages, it is likely that the higher wage deciles would increase by
more than the lower wage deciles.
236 Conclusion
Workers have become increasingly concerned about the impact that o⁄shoring and immigra-
tion have on wages. Despite extensive research, which generally focuses on one or the other
of these phenomena, the available evidence on the link between o⁄shoring, immigration,
and wages remains mixed. This paper presents a simple model that identi￿es the ways in
which o⁄shoring and immigration can a⁄ect wages. Both o⁄shoring and immigration gener-
ate a labor-supply e⁄ect, while o⁄shoring also generates a productivity e⁄ect that bene￿ts
low-skilled native workers. Thus, comparing the impact of o⁄shoring and immigration on
native wages o⁄ers a unique opportunity to test for the productivity e⁄ect.
The empirical results con￿rm that o⁄shoring and immigration have di⁄erent impacts on
native wages and highlight the importance of the productivity e⁄ect. Consistent with the
propositions of the model, o⁄shoring has a more positive impact on low-skilled native wages
than immigration, but this di⁄erence decreases as the wage deciles increase. These results
provide direct empirical evidence that o⁄shoring generates a productivity e⁄ect that bene￿ts
the factor whose jobs are sent abroad. More generally the empirical results presented in this
paper improve our understanding of how o⁄shoring and immigration a⁄ect native wages.
The ￿ndings move us past simply thinking about whether o⁄shoring and immigration are
good or bad for the domestic economy, and instead identi￿es how speci￿c components of
o⁄shoring and immigration a⁄ect particular types of native workers.
Overall, this paper shows that the impact of these important types of globalization
on wages is not as bad as many American workers fear. Speci￿cally, the o⁄shoring of
low-skilled tasks to less-developed countries complements domestic workers, generates a
productivity enhancing e⁄ect, and increases low-skilled native wages. However, there is
evidence that certain components of o⁄shoring and immigration can depress the wages of
speci￿c types of native workers. Policy makers need to recognize these di⁄erences and take a
more nuanced approach to o⁄shoring and immigration. Obviously the impact of o⁄shoring
and immigration on other dimensions of the home and foreign economies are important and
warrant further research.
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Immigration and Offshoring by Industry
Industry average of the share of employees that are foreign born and












Administration and Waste Services
Health Care





















0 5 10 15 20
Offshoring
28The residuals from regressing the ln native median wage on state,
industry, and year fixed effects are plotted against the residuals from
regressing offshoring on state, industry, and year fixed effects.
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Offshoring Residuals
The residuals from regressing the ln median native wage on state,
industry, and year fixed effects are plotted against the residuals from
regressing immigration on state, industry, and year fixed effects.
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29ln(Wage 25th%) ln(Wage 75th%) ln(Wage 25th%) ln(Wage 75th%)
L_Offshoring 0.044*** 0.010** 0.048*** 0.016***
[0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004]
L_Immigration -0.001** -0.001** -0.002*** -0.001**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
H_Offshoring -0.039*** -0.025*** -0.063*** -0.050***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.010] [0.009]
H_Immigration 0.004*** 0.003*** -0.004 -0.004*
[0.001] [0.001] [0.003] [0.002]
Inshoring 0.027*** 0.038*** 0.048*** 0.058***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.010] [0.009]
Age 0.002 0.003 0.005** 0.005***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Education 0.198*** 0.258*** 0.215*** 0.274***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.010] [0.010]
Male 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Black 0.001* 0.001* 0.001*** 0.001***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Asian 0.001 0.004 0.017*** 0.020***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.006] [0.006]
Hispanic -0.002* -0.001 -0.001 0.000
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Married 0.001 0.002*** 0.000 0.002***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Single -0.005*** -0.002*** -0.005*** -0.002***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Observations 4,704 4,704 4,704 4,704
R-squared 0.961 0.966 0.960 0.965
Robust standard errors in brackets.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  All regressions are
weighted by the sample size and include year, state, industry, state*year, and industry*year fixed effects.
TABLE 1
Impact of Offshoring and Immigration on Native Wages
OLS IV
30L_Offshoring L_Immigration H_Offshoring H_Immigration
L_Offshoring IV 0.879*** -0.105 0.070*** 0.253***
[0.014] [0.106] [0.015] [0.080]
L_Immigration IV -0.001* 0.899*** -0.003*** -0.221***
[0.001] [0.035] [0.001] [0.016]
H_Offshoring IV -0.053** -0.625*** 0.547*** 0.455***
[0.024] [0.157] [0.016] [0.108]
H_Immigration IV 0.002 0.083* 0.002 0.461***
[0.002] [0.047] [0.002] [0.034]
Observations 4,704 4,704 4,704 4,704
R-squared 1.000 0.958 1.000 0.941
F-Stat, Instruments 2315 364 566 63
TABLE 2
First Stage IV Regressions
Robust standard errors in brackets.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  All regressions are









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A.1 Deriving Equation (7):




































^ L + dI
(1+I) ￿ ^ H + dJ
(1￿J)
￿
The ￿rst terms on each side cancel following from the ratio of (4) to (5) and since the
native factor supplies are ￿xed then ^ L = ^ H = 0. Therefore:


































(^ aH￿^ aL)(w￿=s)( ^ w+^ ￿￿^ s)
( ^ w+^ ￿￿^ s) = (^ aH ￿ ^ aL)(w￿=s)
35B Sensitivity Analysis - Not For Publication
B.1 Alternate O⁄shoring Instrument
As an additional check on the results, an alternate o⁄shoring instrument is constructed
using a di⁄erent methodology than the one discussed in section 4.2. Instead of regressing
foreign a¢ liate employment on industry-year and country-year ￿xed e⁄ects, I calculate the
country-year averages of foreign a¢ liate employment across industries. The percent change
in these country-year averages, which vary across countries and years, are multiplied by the
foreign a¢ liate employment in 1999, which varies over industries and countries. As before,
this predicted foreign a¢ liate employment measure is then aggregated and attributed to
states. While the construction of this instrument is slightly di⁄erent, the goal is still to
focus on variation in o⁄shoring that is driven by foreign country shocks and not variation
that is due to U.S. demand shocks that may be correlated with domestic wages.
Results using this alternate o⁄shoring instrument are reported in Table A1. Although
the coe¢ cients on low-skilled o⁄shoring are slightly smaller in magnitude, Table A1 is
consistent with the baseline ￿ndings reported in Table 4 and with the predictions of the
model. The key ￿nding that the productivity e⁄ect is empirically important, is not sensitive
to the construction of the o⁄shoring instrument.
B.2 Native Income
The model predicts that the increase in productivity due to o⁄shoring is passed on to low-
skilled workers in the form of higher wages. The empirical evidence supports this prediction.
However, it is also possible that capital owners or entrepreneurs also bene￿t from the cost
savings associated with o⁄shoring. To examine this issue, it is possible to use total native
income rather than simply native wages as the dependent variable. Total income includes
wages and other types of income, such as business income, interest, dividends, rental income,
social security, welfare, and retirement income. If o⁄shoring and immigration lead to an
increase in the return to capital or an increase in pro￿ts, this would be captured by total
income. One caveat is that the returns to capital or pro￿ts do not need to be restricted to
the state or industry in which the person is employed. However, workers and entrepreneurs
36often have more exposure to and knowledge about local ￿rms and thus they choose to invest
in these companies.
Table A2 reports the IV results using native income deciles as the dependent variable.
Comparing Tables A2 and 4 indicates that o⁄shoring and immigration have a similar impact
on native wages and on native income. Consistent with the baseline regressions, low-skilled
o⁄shoring has a more positive impact on incomes than immigration at the low end of the
distribution, but this gap decreases as the income deciles increase. These results do not
necessarily imply that the impact on other types of income is insigni￿cant, but rather they
highlight the important e⁄ect of o⁄shoring and immigration on wages.24
B.3 Sample
One important constraint on the sample is the availability of the inshoring variable. Begin-
ning in 2007 the BEA changed the way it measures U.S. a¢ liates of foreign ￿rms, which
makes comparisons before and after 2007 impossible. Since the inshoring measure proves
to be an important control, the sample in the baseline analysis is restricted to 2006 and
earlier. However, if inshoring is excluded from the regressions then it is possible to include
years 2007 and 2008 in the analysis.
Table A3 reports the IV results that exclude inshoring from the regressions. Since years
2007 and 2008 are now included, the sample size increases to over six thousand observations.
Despite the fact that inshoring is not included in the analysis and that the sample now
includes two additional years, the results reported in Table A3 are consistent with the
previous ￿ndings. The results con￿rm both propositions of the model and indicate that the
productivity e⁄ect is empirically important.
24Due to a lack of data, it is not possible to seperately estimate the e⁄ect of o⁄shoring on non-wage
income.
37l
n
(
W
a
g
e
 
1
0
t
h
%
)
l
n
(
W
a
g
e
 
2
0
t
h
%
)
l
n
(
W
a
g
e
 
3
0
t
h
%
)
l
n
(
W
a
g
e
 
4
0
t
h
%
)
l
n
(
W
a
g
e
 
5
0
t
h
%
)
l
n
(
W
a
g
e
 
6
0
t
h
%
)
l
n
(
W
a
g
e
 
7
0
t
h
%
)
l
n
(
W
a
g
e
 
8
0
t
h
%
)
L
_
O
f
f
s
h
o
r
i
n
g
0
.
0
6
1
*
*
*
0
.
0
5
0
*
*
*
0
.
0
4
2
*
*
*
0
.
0
3
4
*
*
*
0
.
0
3
4
*
*
*
0
.
0
3
1
*
*
*
0
.
0
2
4
*
*
*
0
.
0
1
5
*
*
*
[
0
.
0
0
7
]
[
0
.
0
0
5
]
[
0
.
0
0
5
]
[
0
.
0
0
4
]
[
0
.
0
0
4
]
[
0
.
0
0
4
]
[
0
.
0
0
4
]
[
0
.
0
0
4
]
L
_
I
m
m
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
-
0
.
0
0
2
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
2
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
3
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
2
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
2
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
1
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
1
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
1
*
*
*
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
H
_
O
f
f
s
h
o
r
i
n
g
-
0
.
1
1
7
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
8
2
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
6
7
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
6
9
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
6
5
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
5
8
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
5
6
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
6
3
*
*
*
[
0
.
0
1
6
]
[
0
.
0
1
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
9
]
[
0
.
0
0
8
]
[
0
.
0
0
8
]
[
0
.
0
0
8
]
[
0
.
0
0
8
]
[
0
.
0
0
9
]
H
_
I
m
m
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
-
0
.
0
0
8
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
5
*
-
0
.
0
0
6
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
4
*
-
0
.
0
0
5
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
6
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
6
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
6
*
[
0
.
0
0
4
]
[
0
.
0
0
3
]
[
0
.
0
0
3
]
[
0
.
0
0
2
]
[
0
.
0
0
2
]
[
0
.
0
0
2
]
[
0
.
0
0
3
]
[
0
.
0
0
3
]
I
n
s
h
o
r
i
n
g
0
.
1
0
0
*
*
*
0
.
0
6
6
*
*
*
0
.
0
5
5
*
*
*
0
.
0
6
4
*
*
*
0
.
0
5
9
*
*
*
0
.
0
5
5
*
*
*
0
.
0
5
9
*
*
*
0
.
0
7
3
*
*
*
[
0
.
0
1
7
]
[
0
.
0
1
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
9
]
[
0
.
0
0
8
]
[
0
.
0
0
8
]
[
0
.
0
0
8
]
[
0
.
0
0
9
]
[
0
.
0
1
0
]
A
g
e
0
.
0
0
7
*
0
.
0
0
6
*
*
0
.
0
0
7
*
*
*
0
.
0
0
5
*
*
*
0
.
0
0
5
*
*
*
0
.
0
0
5
*
*
*
0
.
0
0
6
*
*
*
0
.
0
0
7
*
*
*
[
0
.
0
0
4
]
[
0
.
0
0
3
]
[
0
.
0
0
2
]
[
0
.
0
0
2
]
[
0
.
0
0
2
]
[
0
.
0
0
2
]
[
0
.
0
0
2
]
[
0
.
0
0
2
]
E
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
0
.
2
0
8
*
*
*
0
.
2
1
2
*
*
*
0
.
2
2
5
*
*
*
0
.
2
3
0
*
*
*
0
.
2
4
4
*
*
*
0
.
2
5
7
*
*
*
0
.
2
6
8
*
*
*
0
.
2
9
6
*
*
*
[
0
.
0
1
6
]
[
0
.
0
1
1
]
[
0
.
0
1
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
9
]
[
0
.
0
0
9
]
[
0
.
0
0
9
]
[
0
.
0
1
0
]
[
0
.
0
1
6
]
M
a
l
e
0
.
0
0
9
*
*
*
0
.
0
0
9
*
*
*
0
.
0
0
9
*
*
*
0
.
0
0
9
*
*
*
0
.
0
1
0
*
*
*
0
.
0
1
0
*
*
*
0
.
0
1
0
*
*
*
0
.
0
0
9
*
*
*
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
B
l
a
c
k
0
.
0
0
0
0
.
0
0
1
0
.
0
0
2
*
*
*
0
.
0
0
2
*
*
*
0
.
0
0
2
*
*
*
0
.
0
0
2
*
*
*
0
.
0
0
1
*
*
*
0
.
0
0
1
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
A
s
i
a
n
0
.
0
2
6
*
*
*
0
.
0
2
5
*
*
*
0
.
0
2
0
*
*
*
0
.
0
1
6
*
*
*
0
.
0
1
7
*
*
*
0
.
0
2
3
*
*
*
0
.
0
2
5
*
*
*
0
.
0
2
5
*
*
*
[
0
.
0
0
9
]
[
0
.
0
0
6
]
[
0
.
0
0
6
]
[
0
.
0
0
5
]
[
0
.
0
0
5
]
[
0
.
0
0
5
]
[
0
.
0
0
6
]
[
0
.
0
0
8
]
H
i
s
p
a
n
i
c
-
0
.
0
0
2
-
0
.
0
0
2
0
.
0
0
0
-
0
.
0
0
1
-
0
.
0
0
1
-
0
.
0
0
1
-
0
.
0
0
1
0
.
0
0
1
[
0
.
0
0
2
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
M
a
r
r
i
e
d
0
.
0
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
0
.
0
0
1
0
.
0
0
1
*
*
0
.
0
0
1
*
*
0
.
0
0
2
*
*
*
0
.
0
0
1
*
*
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
S
i
n
g
l
e
-
0
.
0
0
4
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
5
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
4
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
4
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
3
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
3
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
2
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
1
[
0
.
0
0
2
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
4
,
7
0
4
4
,
7
0
4
4
,
7
0
4
4
,
7
0
4
4
,
7
0
4
4
,
7
0
4
4
,
7
0
4
4
,
7
0
4
R
-
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
0
.
9
2
9
0
.
9
5
5
0
.
9
6
3
0
.
9
6
7
0
.
9
6
8
0
.
9
6
7
0
.
9
6
5
0
.
9
5
6
T
A
B
L
E
 
A
1
I
m
p
a
c
t
 
o
f
 
O
f
f
s
h
o
r
i
n
g
 
a
n
d
 
I
m
m
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
n
 
N
a
t
i
v
e
 
W
a
g
e
 
D
e
c
i
l
e
s
 
(
I
V
)
,
 
U
s
i
n
g
 
A
l
t
e
r
n
a
t
e
 
O
f
f
s
h
o
r
i
n
g
 
I
V
R
o
b
u
s
t
 
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
 
i
n
 
b
r
a
c
k
e
t
s
.
 
 
*
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
1
0
%
;
 
*
*
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
5
%
;
 
*
*
*
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
1
%
.
 
 
A
l
l
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
a
r
e
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
s
i
z
e
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
 
y
e
a
r
,
 
s
t
a
t
e
,
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
,
 
s
t
a
t
e
*
y
e
a
r
,
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
*
y
e
a
r
 
f
i
x
e
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
.
38l
n
(
I
n
c
o
m
e
 
1
0
t
h
%
)
l
n
(
I
n
c
o
m
e
 
2
0
t
h
%
)
l
n
(
I
n
c
o
m
e
 
3
0
t
h
%
)
l
n
(
I
n
c
o
m
e
 
4
0
t
h
%
)
l
n
(
I
n
c
o
m
e
 
5
0
t
h
%
)
l
n
(
I
n
c
o
m
e
 
6
0
t
h
%
)
l
n
(
I
n
c
o
m
e
 
7
0
t
h
%
)
l
n
(
I
n
c
o
m
e
 
8
0
t
h
%
)
L
_
O
f
f
s
h
o
r
i
n
g
0
.
0
7
8
*
*
*
0
.
0
5
7
*
*
*
0
.
0
4
4
*
*
*
0
.
0
3
9
*
*
*
0
.
0
3
8
*
*
*
0
.
0
3
2
*
*
*
0
.
0
2
4
*
*
*
0
.
0
1
4
*
*
*
[
0
.
0
0
7
]
[
0
.
0
0
5
]
[
0
.
0
0
4
]
[
0
.
0
0
4
]
[
0
.
0
0
4
]
[
0
.
0
0
3
]
[
0
.
0
0
3
]
[
0
.
0
0
4
]
L
_
I
m
m
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
-
0
.
0
0
2
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
2
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
2
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
2
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
2
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
1
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
1
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
2
*
*
*
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
H
_
O
f
f
s
h
o
r
i
n
g
-
0
.
1
0
9
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
6
9
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
6
6
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
6
1
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
5
6
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
4
9
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
4
7
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
3
6
*
*
*
[
0
.
0
1
6
]
[
0
.
0
1
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
9
]
[
0
.
0
0
8
]
[
0
.
0
0
8
]
[
0
.
0
0
8
]
[
0
.
0
0
8
]
[
0
.
0
1
1
]
H
_
I
m
m
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
-
0
.
0
1
7
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
8
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
6
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
5
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
7
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
8
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
7
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
9
*
*
*
[
0
.
0
0
4
]
[
0
.
0
0
3
]
[
0
.
0
0
2
]
[
0
.
0
0
2
]
[
0
.
0
0
2
]
[
0
.
0
0
2
]
[
0
.
0
0
2
]
[
0
.
0
0
3
]
I
n
s
h
o
r
i
n
g
0
.
0
8
0
*
*
*
0
.
0
4
7
*
*
*
0
.
0
5
3
*
*
*
0
.
0
5
2
*
*
*
0
.
0
4
7
*
*
*
0
.
0
4
3
*
*
*
0
.
0
4
8
*
*
*
0
.
0
4
4
*
*
*
[
0
.
0
1
6
]
[
0
.
0
1
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
9
]
[
0
.
0
0
8
]
[
0
.
0
0
8
]
[
0
.
0
0
9
]
[
0
.
0
0
9
]
[
0
.
0
1
1
]
A
g
e
0
.
0
0
6
0
.
0
0
5
*
0
.
0
0
4
*
0
.
0
0
3
*
0
.
0
0
4
*
*
0
.
0
0
4
*
*
0
.
0
0
6
*
*
*
0
.
0
0
6
*
*
*
[
0
.
0
0
4
]
[
0
.
0
0
3
]
[
0
.
0
0
2
]
[
0
.
0
0
2
]
[
0
.
0
0
2
]
[
0
.
0
0
2
]
[
0
.
0
0
2
]
[
0
.
0
0
2
]
E
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
0
.
2
2
7
*
*
*
0
.
2
2
7
*
*
*
0
.
2
3
6
*
*
*
0
.
2
4
1
*
*
*
0
.
2
5
8
*
*
*
0
.
2
7
4
*
*
*
0
.
2
8
0
*
*
*
0
.
2
9
6
*
*
*
[
0
.
0
1
5
]
[
0
.
0
1
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
9
]
[
0
.
0
0
8
]
[
0
.
0
0
8
]
[
0
.
0
0
9
]
[
0
.
0
0
9
]
[
0
.
0
1
5
]
M
a
l
e
0
.
0
0
9
*
*
*
0
.
0
0
9
*
*
*
0
.
0
0
9
*
*
*
0
.
0
0
9
*
*
*
0
.
0
0
9
*
*
*
0
.
0
1
0
*
*
*
0
.
0
0
9
*
*
*
0
.
0
0
9
*
*
*
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
B
l
a
c
k
-
0
.
0
0
1
0
.
0
0
0
0
.
0
0
1
*
*
0
.
0
0
1
*
*
*
0
.
0
0
1
*
*
*
0
.
0
0
1
*
*
*
0
.
0
0
1
*
*
0
.
0
0
0
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
A
s
i
a
n
0
.
0
3
2
*
*
*
0
.
0
2
1
*
*
*
0
.
0
1
3
*
*
0
.
0
1
4
*
*
*
0
.
0
1
7
*
*
*
0
.
0
2
3
*
*
*
0
.
0
2
5
*
*
*
0
.
0
2
9
*
*
*
[
0
.
0
0
9
]
[
0
.
0
0
6
]
[
0
.
0
0
5
]
[
0
.
0
0
5
]
[
0
.
0
0
5
]
[
0
.
0
0
5
]
[
0
.
0
0
6
]
[
0
.
0
0
8
]
H
i
s
p
a
n
i
c
-
0
.
0
0
3
*
-
0
.
0
0
2
*
-
0
.
0
0
1
-
0
.
0
0
2
*
-
0
.
0
0
2
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
2
*
0
.
0
0
0
0
.
0
0
1
[
0
.
0
0
2
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
M
a
r
r
i
e
d
-
0
.
0
0
4
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
3
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
1
*
0
.
0
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
0
.
0
0
1
0
.
0
0
1
*
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
S
i
n
g
l
e
-
0
.
0
0
8
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
5
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
5
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
4
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
3
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
3
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
2
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
1
[
0
.
0
0
2
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
4
,
7
0
4
4
,
7
0
4
4
,
7
0
4
4
,
7
0
4
4
,
7
0
4
4
,
7
0
4
4
,
7
0
4
4
,
7
0
4
R
-
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
0
.
9
2
7
0
.
9
5
5
0
.
9
6
4
0
.
9
6
7
0
.
9
6
8
0
.
9
6
7
0
.
9
6
6
0
.
9
5
8
T
A
B
L
E
 
A
2
I
m
p
a
c
t
 
o
f
 
O
f
f
s
h
o
r
i
n
g
 
a
n
d
 
I
m
m
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
n
 
N
a
t
i
v
e
 
I
n
c
o
m
e
 
D
e
c
i
l
e
s
 
(
I
V
)
R
o
b
u
s
t
 
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
 
i
n
 
b
r
a
c
k
e
t
s
.
 
 
*
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
1
0
%
;
 
*
*
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
5
%
;
 
*
*
*
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
1
%
.
 
 
A
l
l
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
a
r
e
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
s
i
z
e
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
 
y
e
a
r
,
 
s
t
a
t
e
,
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
,
s
t
a
t
e
*
y
e
a
r
,
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
*
y
e
a
r
 
f
i
x
e
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
.
39l
n
(
W
a
g
e
 
1
0
t
h
%
)
l
n
(
W
a
g
e
 
2
0
t
h
%
)
l
n
(
W
a
g
e
 
3
0
t
h
%
)
l
n
(
W
a
g
e
 
4
0
t
h
%
)
l
n
(
W
a
g
e
 
5
0
t
h
%
)
l
n
(
W
a
g
e
 
6
0
t
h
%
)
l
n
(
W
a
g
e
 
7
0
t
h
%
)
l
n
(
W
a
g
e
 
8
0
t
h
%
)
L
_
O
f
f
s
h
o
r
i
n
g
0
.
0
5
7
*
*
*
0
.
0
4
7
*
*
*
0
.
0
3
8
*
*
*
0
.
0
3
3
*
*
*
0
.
0
3
2
*
*
*
0
.
0
2
8
*
*
*
0
.
0
2
3
*
*
*
0
.
0
1
7
*
*
*
[
0
.
0
1
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
7
]
[
0
.
0
0
5
]
[
0
.
0
0
5
]
[
0
.
0
0
4
]
[
0
.
0
0
4
]
[
0
.
0
0
5
]
[
0
.
0
0
6
]
L
_
I
m
m
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
-
0
.
0
0
2
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
2
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
3
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
2
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
2
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
1
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
1
*
-
0
.
0
0
1
*
*
*
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
H
_
O
f
f
s
h
o
r
i
n
g
-
0
.
0
2
3
*
*
-
0
.
0
1
9
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
1
4
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
1
0
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
9
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
5
-
0
.
0
0
2
0
.
0
0
2
[
0
.
0
0
9
]
[
0
.
0
0
6
]
[
0
.
0
0
5
]
[
0
.
0
0
4
]
[
0
.
0
0
4
]
[
0
.
0
0
4
]
[
0
.
0
0
4
]
[
0
.
0
0
5
]
H
_
I
m
m
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
-
0
.
0
0
7
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
6
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
6
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
4
*
-
0
.
0
0
5
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
6
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
5
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
4
[
0
.
0
0
3
]
[
0
.
0
0
3
]
[
0
.
0
0
2
]
[
0
.
0
0
2
]
[
0
.
0
0
2
]
[
0
.
0
0
2
]
[
0
.
0
0
2
]
[
0
.
0
0
3
]
A
g
e
0
.
0
0
2
0
.
0
0
4
0
.
0
0
5
*
*
0
.
0
0
3
*
0
.
0
0
3
0
.
0
0
2
0
.
0
0
3
*
0
.
0
0
3
*
[
0
.
0
0
3
]
[
0
.
0
0
2
]
[
0
.
0
0
2
]
[
0
.
0
0
2
]
[
0
.
0
0
2
]
[
0
.
0
0
2
]
[
0
.
0
0
2
]
[
0
.
0
0
2
]
E
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
0
.
2
2
0
*
*
*
0
.
2
2
1
*
*
*
0
.
2
3
2
*
*
*
0
.
2
4
1
*
*
*
0
.
2
5
8
*
*
*
0
.
2
7
1
*
*
*
0
.
2
8
3
*
*
*
0
.
3
0
6
*
*
*
[
0
.
0
1
4
]
[
0
.
0
1
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
8
]
[
0
.
0
0
8
]
[
0
.
0
0
8
]
[
0
.
0
0
8
]
[
0
.
0
0
9
]
[
0
.
0
1
3
]
M
a
l
e
0
.
0
1
0
*
*
*
0
.
0
1
0
*
*
*
0
.
0
0
9
*
*
*
0
.
0
1
0
*
*
*
0
.
0
1
0
*
*
*
0
.
0
1
0
*
*
*
0
.
0
1
0
*
*
*
0
.
0
0
9
*
*
*
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
B
l
a
c
k
0
.
0
0
0
0
.
0
0
1
*
0
.
0
0
2
*
*
*
0
.
0
0
2
*
*
*
0
.
0
0
2
*
*
*
0
.
0
0
2
*
*
*
0
.
0
0
1
*
*
*
0
.
0
0
1
*
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
A
s
i
a
n
0
.
0
1
9
*
*
0
.
0
2
4
*
*
*
0
.
0
2
1
*
*
*
0
.
0
1
6
*
*
*
0
.
0
1
7
*
*
*
0
.
0
2
2
*
*
*
0
.
0
2
2
*
*
*
0
.
0
2
1
*
*
*
[
0
.
0
0
8
]
[
0
.
0
0
6
]
[
0
.
0
0
5
]
[
0
.
0
0
5
]
[
0
.
0
0
5
]
[
0
.
0
0
5
]
[
0
.
0
0
5
]
[
0
.
0
0
7
]
H
i
s
p
a
n
i
c
-
0
.
0
0
2
-
0
.
0
0
1
0
.
0
0
0
-
0
.
0
0
1
-
0
.
0
0
1
-
0
.
0
0
1
*
-
0
.
0
0
1
0
.
0
0
1
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
M
a
r
r
i
e
d
0
.
0
0
1
0
.
0
0
0
0
.
0
0
1
0
.
0
0
1
*
0
.
0
0
2
*
*
*
0
.
0
0
2
*
*
*
0
.
0
0
2
*
*
*
0
.
0
0
2
*
*
*
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
S
i
n
g
l
e
-
0
.
0
0
5
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
5
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
5
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
4
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
4
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
4
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
3
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
2
*
*
*
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
6
,
0
4
8
6
,
0
4
8
6
,
0
4
8
6
,
0
4
8
6
,
0
4
8
6
,
0
4
8
6
,
0
4
8
6
,
0
4
8
R
-
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
0
.
9
3
5
0
.
9
5
8
0
.
9
6
6
0
.
9
7
0
.
9
7
1
0
.
9
7
0
.
9
6
9
0
.
9
6
2
T
A
B
L
E
 
A
3
I
m
p
a
c
t
 
o
f
 
O
f
f
s
h
o
r
i
n
g
 
a
n
d
 
I
m
m
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
n
 
N
a
t
i
v
e
 
W
a
g
e
 
D
e
c
i
l
e
s
 
(
I
V
)
,
 
I
n
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
 
2
0
0
7
 
a
n
d
 
2
0
0
8
R
o
b
u
s
t
 
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
 
i
n
 
b
r
a
c
k
e
t
s
.
 
 
*
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
1
0
%
;
 
*
*
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
5
%
;
 
*
*
*
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
1
%
.
 
 
A
l
l
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
a
r
e
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
s
i
z
e
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
 
y
e
a
r
,
 
s
t
a
t
e
,
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
,
s
t
a
t
e
*
y
e
a
r
,
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
*
y
e
a
r
 
f
i
x
e
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
.
40